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along by uncompromising appeals to
patriotism and by the moral certitude
of a just cause and an imminent
victory.
The economy was in the doldrums
when war began, and the inevitable
interruptions of trade made matters
worse. It took a year or more before
the war-induced boom began to take
hold, grain exports increased, and the
first munitions were sold. Canada’s

ith its population of some
eight million and with only a
rudimentary industrial base, Canada
was completely unprepared for
war in August 1914, unprepared
psychologically, militarily, and
organizationally. No such conflict
had happened before, and no one
in government or out could have
contemplated the reality of the
next four years of war. Those who
thought ahead in that summer of 1914
envisaged a few short, sharp battles
on land, the triumph of Britain’s
Royal Navy at sea, and a triumphal
march into Berlin led by the French,
Abstract: On the world wars at home,
we were conscious of just scratching
the surface. In part, brevity reflected
scholarship: the many issues, great and
small, that generations of historians
have failed to elucidate, or those on
which popular myth, passionately
argued, still crowd out sober judgement.
In part too, we self-censored, trying not
to repeat entries elsewhere in the book.
Even in skimming trees we covered
plenty, although arguably – especially
for World War I – not quite enough.
Industry, women, local history, the
economy, home defence, governance,
administration, and wartime politics
in both wars could all stand more
room than time and sheaf space easily
allowed. Of the summative challenges
we faced in the book, these entries were
among the greatest.

Russian, and British armies. The only
question in most minds was whether
the Canadian volunteers would get to
the front in time to test their mettle
before the German Kaiser’s Prussian
hordes had run up the white flag in
precipitous surrender. The justness
of the cause was unquestioned and
Canada, as a British colony, was in
the war at once, bound legally by
Britain’s declaration of hostilities.
Even in Quebec, especially Montreal,
where pro-imperial sentiment found
less popular traction and fewer vocal
advocates among francophones,
there seemed initially to be little
doubt. Across the country, young
Canadians hurried to sign up, hustled
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Résumé : Nous étions conscients d’à
peine aborder le sujet des guerres
mondiales au pays. La concision reflétait
en partie l’état de la recherche : les
nombreux sujets, petits et grands, que
des générations d’historiens n’ont pu
éclaircir, ou ceux pour lesquels les
légendes populaires, défendues avec
passion, laissent peu de place aux
analyses sereines. Nous nous sommes
aussi en partie censurés afin d’éviter
de répéter ce qui figurait ailleurs dans
l’ouvrage. Même en mesurant notre
prose, nous avons couvert beaucoup de
terrain, quoique, sans doute – pour la
Première Guerre mondiale en particulier
– insuffisamment. L’industrie, les
femmes, l’histoire locale, l’économie,
la défense du pays, la gouvernance,
l’administration et les politiques du
temps de guerre, et ce pour les deux
guerres, méritaient tous davantage
d’attention que ne le permettaient
le temps et l’espace. Ces sujets se
classent parmi les principaux défis
auxquels nous avons dû faire face dans
cet ouvrage.
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production of artillery shells, after
November 1915 wholly controlled
by the Imperial Munitions Board,
would amount to over $1 billion
worth, a huge sum by any standard.
The war eventually created labour
shortages as men went into the army
and factories went on double shifts,
and workers, male and female, came
to the cities from rural areas. That, in
turn, created a farm labour shortage
that left farmers, struggling to plant
and then bring in crops that could
command good prices for once,
desperate for help. Wartime inflation
pushed up the price of food, leading
city dwellers, many of them earning
better wages than before the war,
to curse farmers for their financial
opportunism and supposed failure
to enlist for military service. The
wartime calls for “A New National
Policy” of lower tariffs and the
postwar rise of farmer progressivism
had their roots in this strain.
Another factor was conscription.
To farmers, compulsory military
service meant that even less labour
would be available for their use.
Their argument that food was as
much a war-winning weapon as
armaments was true enough, but it
received little broader credence in the
feverish atmosphere of 1917. Victory
then was everything, and Canada
needed every recruit it could possibly
find to be at the front. Including
French-speaking Canadians? That
was a problem. Quebec, while happy
enough to operate war factories, was
not sending volunteers to the army in
anything like the numbers of English
Canada. There were no hard data
available for public discussion, but
none truly believed that francophone
volunteers amounted to more than
25,000 or so, if that. Québécois
nationalists noted, with some justice,
that Canada’s enlistment figures were
badly skewed: it was the British-born
who were enlisting, they argued, and
not the English-speaking Canadianborn. Moreover, the language
of the army was English, there
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The Rod Turner – Frances Loring

were almost no French-speaking
senior officers, Minister of Militia
and Defence Sam Hughes was an
Orangeman who hated Catholics,
and the real threat to French Canada
lay in Ontario where Regulation 17
forced English on French-speaking

children. Why should
French Canadians enlist
to fight the Prussians
when it was in Ontario
that the French language
was actually threatened?
The passage of the Military
Service Act in August 1917 and
the imposition of conscription
split the country. The farmers won
sweeping exemptions just before the
election; the francophones did not.
Both would be called up wholesale
when the Germans’ 1918 offensives
threatened to win the war. For good
measure, the Borden government
guaranteed itself election victory
when its Military Voters Act and
its Wartime Elections Act gave the
vote to soldiers to use where most
helpful for the government, took
away the votes of recent immigrants,
and granted them to women relatives
of soldiers. The December 1917
election also hit a new low in racism,
Quebec being damned as a slacker
province and Liberal leader and
anti-conscription stalwart Sir Wilfrid
Laurier as the Kaiser’s henchman.
The vote for women may have
been an election- winning tactic in
1917, but it was also implemented
in recognition of the role women
had played in the war. Working
in factories, replacing men as tram
drivers, knitting socks for soldiers,
or working in the fields, women
had earned the vote. Other social
reforms also moved quickly forward
in the hothouse atmosphere of the
war. Prohibition was necessary so
scarce alcohol could be used for
munitions. Income taxes came into
place to make those who earned
most carry their share of the war’s
costs. Implemented in 1917 after
the Americans came into the war
and imposed it on their citizens,
food rationing in theory meant that
scarce goods could be more equally
shared. And the state intruded into
hitherto forbidden areas: for example,
as venereal disease spread rapidly,
keeping men from the front, Ottawa
3
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and the provinces entered into their
first shared cost program to counter it.
The war created an enormous
gap between those at home and
those who fought. The bitterness
of returning soldiers in 1919, their
rage against the French Canadians,
the immigrants, the profiteers, the
slackers, embittered Canadian life
for a generation. It divided city from
country, French from English, worker
from management, and young from
old in ways that sparked regional
resentment, political division, and
social and labour conflict. This was
true even as Canadians celebrated
justly their achievements in arms,
the return of their heroes, and the
role claimed by the Dominion in
imperial affairs as the result of its
wartime efforts. Remembrance and
commemoration were civic duties
even as tight-fisted governments

shrank the military, reduced
budgets, and struggled to ensure
that payments to veterans did not
crush the exchequer. Close-lipped
old soldiers might choose to forget
the war that those who were not there
never understood, but its scars and
impacts echoed through the interwar
period just the same. Conscription in
the Second World War was an issue
precisely because of the memories of
the First World War. Because of the
1914–1918 experience, the public and
the government had some sense of
what might be expected.
Canada in 1939 was still
caught in the Great Depression
with unemployment high and the
economy groaning. There was
no enthusiasm anywhere for the
coming war, certainly not in French
Canada or on the farms across
the nation. The wave of public

enthusiasm that greeted the Munich
agreement of September 1938 – the
pact that stripped the Sudetenland
from Czechoslovakia in a triumph
of Anglo-French appeasement –
demonstrated that such sentiments
were far more widely shared than
in 1914. There was also growing
fear that appeasement would not
be enough. The very real sense that
Adolf Hitler and the Nazis were
a menace to democracy increased
sharply when Hitler tore up the
September agreements by marching
into Prague in March 1939. War
in Europe was coming; Japanese
expansion in China and its growing
naval power suggested, especially
to those living along the vulnerable
West Coast, that it might not be long
in engulfing the Pacific either.
The public’s attitude at the
beginning of the war in Europe in
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Forging 6-inch Shells, Toronto – George Reid
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Top left: Mackenzie King and members
of the Cabinet broadcasting messages
to the Canadian people following the
special emergency Cabinet meeting
following Great Britain’s declaration
of war, 3 September 1939. From left
to right, C.G. Power, Ernest Lapointe,
Mackenzie King, and Norman Rogers.
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Bottom left: C.D. Howe was the minister
of munitions and supply during the war,
but his galvanizing spark made him
Canada’s “minister of everything.”

September 1939 was one of fearful
resignation. The memory of the
terrible casualties of the First World
War hung heavily over the country,
and in Quebec the scars of the 1917
conscription crisis were still fresh. For
Prime Minister Mackenzie King, the
wartime task was to bring Canada
into and through the war undivided,
or at least substantially less divided
than in the earlier struggle. He had
to bring Quebec along as Canada
entered the war against Germany,
while managing the enthusiasms
of more imperialistic Canadians
who would, then as before, press
Ottawa for automatic commitments
and maximal efforts on behalf of the
mother country. He could not – and
did not want to – dissociate Canada
from the British position, nor could
58 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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he endorse it so closely or so soon
as to divide his party, his base of
support in Quebec, or his ability to
conduct the war at home. The Statute
of Westminster of 1931 made Canada
autonomous in foreign policy, but the
statute’s powers had yet to be tested.
King’s answer in September 1939
as British and French ultimatums
to Germany for its retreat from an
invaded Poland expired and the
great powers marched again to war,
was to call Parliament, permitting
Canadians, at least nominally, to
decide if their country should join
the war. The result of the discussion
was preordained and entirely
academic, given his party’s strength
in the House and the Conservatives’
united support for hostilities, but
the week-long delay, leading to a

declaration of war on 10 September,
one week after Britain, demonstrated
autonomy, appeased the imperialists,
and mollified – more or less – critics
in Quebec. Whether the country’s
national interests were yet at stake in
a war in Europe was another question
entirely.
In effect, Canada had played no
part in prewar diplomacy, and went
to war when Britain did for much the
same reasons as in 1914. The nature of
the German regime (and that of Italy
and Japan as well) would become
truly apparent only later, despite
growing public evidence, much of it
disgracefully ignored in Canada as
elsewhere, of the plight of Europe’s
Jews. The extent and pace of fascist
ambitions could no longer be denied
in September 1939, however, and
these surely were worth opposing,
even for former proto-isolationists
like King. Anglo-Canadian opinion
would never have countenanced noninvolvement in any case, and King
was always aware of the strength of
this view. A wily prime minister had
made a wise call at the right time for
the right reason; that he could have
done no less was beside the point.
Political adroitness notwithstanding,
entering the war was one thing;
fighting it was another.
Mackenzie King’s war was
initially to be one of “limited liability.”
Canada would do its part but it
would not risk tearing itself asunder
by virtue of its effort, as it had in the
First World War. The prime minister
would have preferred not to send an
army division overseas early in the
5
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population over 14 years of age. And,
of course, 1.1 million men and women
served in the wartime armed forces.
The government needed money
to pay for the war’s costs, and
increased taxes provided much of it.
Ottawa’s authority was constrained
by the British North America Act’s
separation of powers between the
federal and provincial governments—
until the federal budget of 29 April
1941 announced Ottawa’s intention
to levy the taxes required to fund
the war, paying to every province
that agreed to surrender its income,
corporate, and succession taxes an
annual payment equal to its previous
revenues from these fields. This
was to be a voluntary agreement,
Ottawa pronounced piously, but
any province that failed to agree
could face the burden of saddling its
citizens with double taxation. There
were pro forma protests, but the
provinces caved in. The DominionProvincial Taxation Agreement
Act, 1942 formalized the deal. The
government now had the taxation
room it needed to fight the war.
Excise, sales, and retail purchase

taxes were increased or imposed.
Raw tobacco faced a ten cents a
pound levy, cigarette taxes increased
from $5 to $6 a thousand; cameras,
photographs, and radio tubes had a
ten percent tax added to their cost,
and a luxury tax on virtually all
entertainment added 20 percent to the
cost of movies and sporting events.
A War Exchange Tax, ordinarily 10
percent, raised revenue and deterred
unnecessary imports, thus preserving
scarce US dollars.
The rates of corporation and
income taxes increased dramatically.
At the beginning of the war, a married
man with two children paid no
income tax at all unless he was in
the upper brackets; if he earned
$3,000, his income tax was $10. Four
years later, after tax increases had
squeezed hard, the $3,000 a year
man was paying $334 in income
tax and an additional amount of
$1,200 in “compulsory savings,”
a surcharge in the form of a loan
to be repaid at the end of the war.
The ingenuity of the federal finance
department was almost as unlimited
as the government’s need for
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struggle, but his Cabinet insisted.
Even so, King forced the British to
agree that the British Commonwealth
Air Training Plan (BCATP), huge
and expensive as it was, would be
Canada’s primary role. Nor would
there be any conscription for overseas
service. King had promised this in
March 1939 (as had the Opposition
leader, Dr. R.J. Manion), and he
repeated it in September. These
attitudes persisted into the spring of
1940, long enough for the Liberals to
be re-elected in a landslide. But the
Germans swallowed Denmark and
Norway in April and stunningly
crushed the Low Countries and
France in May and June. Britain
was now alone, Canada and its 11
million people now its major ally.
The budget caps on war expenditures
came off, the economy began to hum,
and Canada was wholeheartedly
in the war. C.D. Howe, hitherto
the transport minister, became the
minister of munitions and supply,
and “C.D.” provided the galvanizing
spark. He would become Canada’s
“minister of everything.”
He did not have much to work
with. There were at least 400,000
unemployed and one million on
relief in 1939, while only 3.8 million
had gainful employment, 2 million
of those in agriculture. The gross
national product (GNP) was $5.6
billion, and government spending
was in the range of $680 million
a year. The war altered matters
dramatically: the GNP in 1945 was
$11.8 billion, more than double
the prewar figure. Unemployment
had disappeared and 5.1 million
people had work, with 3.2 million
in industry. The manufacturing
sector had almost doubled in size,
and war industry at its October 1943
peak employed 1.2 million men
and women or 13.3 percent of the
Performing One Half of the Operation
Known as “Applying the Tracks” to a
Valentine Tank – Frederick Taylor
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water; aircraft production reached
14,700 by the beginning of 1945;
and Canada’s auto plants turned
out 45,710 armoured vehicles and
707,000 military trucks of all kinds.
The Canadian army ran on these
vehicles, and so too did much of the
British army.
The total of war production in
Canada was $10.9 billion by 1945,
placing Canada fourth among the
Allies with one-seventh of total
Commonwealth production. The
Canadian military used only a third
of this bounty, and so rich had
Canada become (and so short of hard
currency to pay for anything were
Britain and its Empire) that virtually
all the remainder was given away
as gifts to Britain, or as Mutual Aid
to Britain and the Allies. Mutual
Aid was the Canadian equivalent of
the Americans’ Lend-Lease, and in
percentage terms was more generous.
But there was self-interest here too:
war production in Canada was an
investment in full employment and
in infrastructure-building at home.
Canada was at war, straining
every sinew for victory but,
extraordinarily, the country had
never been so prosperous. There
was work for everyone – fathers,
mothers, daughters – with as much
overtime available in the factories as
individuals could handle. Average
wages increased dramatically, rising
from $956 in 1938 to $1,525 in 1943.
People had the money to eat better
than they had during the Depression,
even if food rationing put limits on
what meat, butter, sugar, coffee,
tea, as well as appliances, autos,
gasoline, and other commodities
were available. But if Canadians
could not buy everything they
wanted, they could save for the
future. The government sold $12.5
billion in Victory Bonds that everyone
purchased (down to children
spending 25 cents on war savings
stamps), and every bond drive was
oversubscribed. At the same time,
bank accounts increased, a cushion

for the expected postwar downturn.
Many flirted with the black market,
trying to get meat or gas or auto tires,
but the government’s Wartime Prices
and Trade Board kept careful watch
on profiteers.
Everyone worried about their
husbands, sons, and brothers in
action overseas, but Canadians
listened to the radio – Lorne Greene
reading the CBC news was “the voice
of doom” but Bert Pearl and “The
Happy Gang” offered good fun and
music – and their kids followed the
adventures of “L for Lanky” about the
crews of Bomber Command when
they were not collecting tin cans,
fruit baskets, or milkweed pods for
recycling and war purposes. Teenage
girls put on bobby socks while
city boys wore zoot suits with big
shoulders and an exaggerated drape
in the pants that somehow defied
clothing rationing, and some zootsuiters fought with servicemen over
girls. Most young people danced to
swing at large dancehalls or listened
to Glenn Miller records. Parents
worried about their daughters having
sex or, worse, an illegitimate child
in an era before birth control was
reliable, while others fretted over
hasty wartime marriages and feared
that divorce would rise high enough
to shake the social order. A wife with
a husband overseas worried that
he was having affairs with English
women (and later Italian, French,
Belgian, Dutch, and German women).
Their servicemen spouses feared
that slackers and the “zombies,” as
home defence conscripts were called
derisively, could be preying on their
lonely wives. Certainly there was
immorality and many marriages
foundered under the stress of long
absence (some soldiers in the 1st
Division were away from Canada

Library and Archives Canada PA 108300

money. Corporation taxes increased
from 18 to 40 percent, generating
$636 million—or nearly half of all
corporate profits—in 1943. Excess
profits taxes produced more revenue.
All profits in excess of 116 2/3 percent
of standard profits (the average of
profit from the not-so-buoyant years
from 1936 to 1939) were taxed at 100
percent. Corporations, however,
were to receive a 20 percent rebate
after the war. “No great fortunes,” the
finance minister said, perhaps with
more optimism than was justified,
“can be accumulated out of wartime
profits.” High corporate and personal
taxes, while they did not stop some
from getting rich out of the war,
tried to ensure that a measure of
equal treatment prevailed. So too
did the freeze on prices and wages,
imposed in October 1941. From
September 1939 to the imposition of
wage and price control, the cost of
living went up 17.8 percent; but, for
the rest of the war, the increase was
only 2.8 percent, the most successful
record of fighting inflation among
all the belligerents. Essentially, the
managers of the wartime economy
had learned from the errors of The
First World War: they taxed heavily
and managed inflation, and the
nation and the war effort benefitted.
With all this money coming in,
wartime spending in Ottawa reached
well above $5 billion in 1945, almost
nine times 1939 spending.
Production increased
dramatically in every sector of the
economy between 1939 and 1945.
Good weather helped produce
bumper crops of grain – 556 million
bushels of grain in 1942, every bit
of which found a market at home
or overseas. Pork production more
than doubled while beef rose by
one-third and agricultural exports
rose threefold. In the iron and steel
industries, pig iron and steel ingot
production more than doubled over
the course of the war, and a nation
that in 1939 had built no merchant
ships, by 1944 had put 345 into the

Opposite: “Loyal citizens do not hoard”
– Rationing signs in the window of a
Montreal shop, May 1942.
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Top left: “Invest in Victory Bonds and
Drive a Nail in Hitler’s Coffin” – Selling
Victory Bonds in Prince Rupert, BC,
1941.
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Below left: Ram tanks in production at
the Montreal Locomotive Works, July
1942.

for six years), but most, like Canada,
survived.
Doctors made house calls (but
in wartime people could pay their
fees as many could not in the 1930s)
and they received extra gas coupons
and access to tires so they could do
so. Comic books, called “Canadian
whites” because scarce dyes went to
war production, reached young boys
and girls, most about superheroes
fighting evil Nazis or Japanese
militarists. Clergymen and social
workers worried about how the
absence of fathers overseas might
affect the way children developed,
62 by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2015
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and juvenile delinquency did show
wartime increases, peaking in 1942.
Life not only went on; it was better
than before the war, even with almost
everyone conscious of what was at
stake.
The war changed Canada
dramatically. Hundreds of thousands
left rural Canada for the factories in
the city, and housing in the cities and
towns became a scarce and expensive
commodity despite government
rent control. Women began to work
in war plants, sometimes bringing
their babies along to daycare centres
at the work site. The scarcity of

men, serving in uniform, opened
up jobs to women that had been
unimaginable in 1939 – from street
car drivers to aircraft designers – and
1.4 million women were employed,
a participation rate of almost one in
three, at the wartime peak in 1945.
When the war ended and the men
came back, many, but not all, of those
jobs disappeared. Later feminist
scholars notwithstanding, most
women wanted to escape the factory
to have a home after the war, along
with a husband and a family, and to
live what was seen as a normal life.
Labour participation rates for women
never returned to their prewar levels
just the same. For women as for men,
the struggle had been transformative.
Unionization increased
dramatically, with government
clearing the way with an order-incouncil (PC 1007 of 17 February 1944)
that confirmed employees’ rights to
form unions and laid out the rules for
defining and certifying bargaining
units. Labour peace could keep vital
production going, and where there
were production bottlenecks and
failures, one way around them was
to create Crown corporations. A
shortage of rubber? Set up a Crown
company to produce synthetic rubber.
Wood veneers for aircraft were in
scarce supply? A Crown corporation
could do the job. Machine tools?
C.D. Howe’s Citadel Merchandising
could get them and make sure they
went where they were most needed.
In all, 28 Crown corporations came
into being during the war, some
manufacturing, some purchasing
and distributing, others supervising
and controlling. The establishment
of Crown companies, operating with
9
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great flexibility outside
the usual bureaucratic
restraints, allowed for
efficiencies. The Liberal
government benefitted
from all this economic
success and public wealth.
People complained and
the Opposition suggested
it could have done it all
better, of course. But King
and the Liberals seemed in
control – and were.
There were still
challenges to King’s
dominance. In September
1939, Premier Maurice
Duplessis in Quebec
called an election to
protest what he saw as
Ottawa’s centralization
of power, with the war
as an excuse. King’s
Quebec ministers went
into the fray and smashed
the Union Nationale
with their promises
against conscription. In
January 1940, Ontario
Premier Mitch Hepburn
complained that Canada was doing
nothing in the war and his legislature
passed a condemnatory motion
that King used as an excuse for a
snap election of his own. He won
massively, happily for him just
before the war in Europe turned
against the Allies. King soon had
to pass the National Resources
Mobilization Act, implementing
home defence conscription, and
his government moved quickly to
squelch (relatively minor) protests
in Quebec by locking up Montreal’s
showboat mayor, Camillien Houde,
who had encouraged his citizens
not to register. The question of
conscription did not go away, with
a conscription plebiscite in April
1942 and a major government crisis
the next month, as well as a genuine
reinforcement shortage in the fall
of 1944 that came close to bringing
the government down. King bobbed
https://scholars.wlu.ca/cmh/vol21/iss4/7

and weaved and sent 16,000 home
defence conscripts overseas, but he
held the government and country
together in a fashion that guaranteed
him his place among Canada’s great
leaders.
King also used the wartime
opportunity to begin to put social
welfare measures into law. In 1940,
he secured provincial consent to
amend the constitution and put
Unemployment Insurance on the
federal government’s books, knowing
that wartime full employment could
fill the coffers so that benefits could be
paid out when (no one thought it was
if) bad times returned with peace. In
1944, with the social democratic Cooperative Commonwealth Federation
showing strength in the opinion
polls and forming the government
in Saskatchewan and the Opposition
in Ontario, King’s government
passed a family allowance bill,

giving mothers a monthly
payment for each child;
for many women, this was
the first money of their
own they had ever had,
and it was intended to be
used to buy milk, cribs,
blankets, baby shoes, and a
myriad of items that would
keep farms and factories
working after the war.
This one scheme was to
cost Ottawa almost half the
total 1939 federal budget,
an indicator of how the war
had changed everything.
And because Ottawa’s
mandarins feared a return
of economic depression,
there was a host of
other plans designed to
spend money to create
jobs: a Veterans Charter
to reward servicemen
and servicewomen with
clothing, money, and
training; money for home
building; money to convert
industry to peacetime
production; money for
great public projects; money for
everything. It worked – the economic
downturn all had expected did not
materialize, and Mackenzie King and
the Liberals won the 1945 election,
narrowly, to be sure, but deservedly
just the same.
This article originally appeared in The Oxford
Companion to Canadian Military History
(2011) and is reprinted with the permission
of Oxford University Press.
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